Other Globalizations: Alternative Transnational Processes and Agents

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Working Paper 4, December 2006
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After the end of ‘really existing socialism’ in 1989-1991, the world witnessed
the advent of triumphant capitalism, of ‘really existing globalization,’ a period of
ideological and, more importantly, utopian crises. Without a strong vision for a different
future, technotopia and electronic and computer capitalism imposed themselves.
Flexible post-Fordist capitalism and a new round of time-space compression, fostered
above all by the Internet, were then able to spread everywhere.

Similarly to what happened with ‘development’ after World War II (see Ribeiro
1992, Escobar 1995, Rist 1997), ‘globalization” since the 1990’s has become an
indicator in capitalist transformation and integration processes. Further, it has become
an ideology and a utopia, a veritable mantra - formulae, recited by transnational,
international and national elites. I want to stress that ‘globalization’ represents to the
post Cold War period (1989/1991-present) what ‘development’ represented to the Cold
War period. There is a main difference, though. During the Cold War years, the division
of the world into two major antagonic forces, socialism and capitalism, created a mirror-
like system of alternatives. In the bi-polar world, socialism was often seen as the overall
alternative to capitalism and vice-versa. Interestingly enough, both sides shared the
belief in the development of production forces as a means to attain progress and a better
life.

As hegemonic ideologies and utopias, development and globalization are often
met with counter-hegemonic discourses and practices. Alternative development has
been a rather diversified power field. In the past three decades, environmentalism has
been the most visible and effective of the alternative discourses within the power field
in which the discussion on development is situated. Some environmentalists have radical positions, adamant against any kind of development, such as the zero growth banner. At the same time, others have presented reformist positions that accept negotiations with developmental agencies (the World Bank, for instance). Such negotiation processes led in the late 1980’s, to the definition of ‘sustainable development,’ a semi-operational formulation. The peak of sustainable development’s mobilizing and reformist power occurred with the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, in 1992 (Ribeiro 1992, Little 1995). Not surprisingly, after the Rio-92 sustainable development has increasingly lost its alternative character and become another normalized and institutionalized discourse ruled by corporate and government interests. Sustainable development’s climax coincided with the end of the Cold War, a period when really existing socialism was retreating to backstage and when the utopian metanarratives of the 19th century reached their limits. With the opening up of the period of triumphant capitalism, ‘development’ increasingly had to share space with ‘globalization,’ another powerful recipe for a good life and humankind’s destiny.

NON-HEGEMONIC GLOBALIZATION

Hegemonic globalization has been characterized by multinational and transnational agents’ actions to seek out neoliberal capitalist goals: state reduction, structural adjustment, privatization and support for private enterprise and capital, redirection of national economies towards foreign markets, free global trade, weakening labor legislation, scaling down or phasing out the welfare state, etc. Financial capital and transnational corporations are often considered as the main agents of globalization. Indeed, the discussion on globalization tends to focus on processes commanded by powerful agents and agencies in a top-down perspective, thus ignoring other processes. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of literature on ‘globalization from below’, almost exclusively focused on political resistance movements to neoliberal globalization. Its main subjects are global civil society, transnational social movements and activists (see, for instance, Aguiton 2003; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Keane 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rosenau 1992; Seoane and Taddei 2001; Vieira 2001; Yuen 2001). This bias
hinders researchers from seeing other forms of non-hegemonic globalization especially the one I call ‘economic globalization from below.’

In this text, I want to shed light on the hidden side of globalization’s political economy, the one in which nation states’ normative and repressive roles are heavily bypassed both on the political and economic spheres. With a view to understanding ‘other globalizations,’ I will explore alternative political and economic processes and agents.

**Political non-hegemonic globalization: the anti/alter-globalization movement**

The 1992 U.N. conference in Rio, the most important mega global ritual of transnational elites in the late 20th century, was also an important structuring moment for the alternative globalization movement. It provided a particularly strategic and pioneering opportunity for environmentalist NGOs and social movements to meet at a parallel event, the Global Forum, precursor to the World Social Forums, and the first occasion on which global civil society met in real public space (Ribeiro 2000). Environmental activism’s transnational characteristics provided the basis for discussions on notions of transnational citizenship and, more importantly, for articulations of transnational networks as a regulating power against neoliberal globalization.

Rio-92 also provided a template that was to shape the scenarios where pro- and anti-globalization networks would meet. This template is a triangle made up of (1) the meeting of the global and transnational establishment and managers (in Rio this was the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, held at a convention center in Jacarepaguá); (2) the meeting of global civil society’s transnational elite (in Rio, the Global Forum meeting); and (3) transnational activists’ street demonstrations against neoliberal globalization.

Since 1992, political counter-hegemonic efforts regarding globalization have increased. The plural composition of movements and coalitions – as well as the diversity of ideological and agenda goals – may be conceived in terms of two major parties: one is identified with anti-globalization while the other with alternative
globalization or *altermondialisation*, as the French call it. This internal division echoes that which existed within the alternative development camp. The difference in positions reflects radical and reformist perspectives. Those who believe that globalization is not inevitable, that it can be stopped or radically changed, comprise the anti-globalization movement. This movement usually expresses itself through ad-hoc coalitions that organize street demonstrations. There are also those who believe that ‘another world is possible’ that eventually, globalization can and must be tamed. These make up the alternative globalization movement and have mostly been linked to the world of NGOs, understood as ‘the new political subjects’ of the 1980's and 1990's. In fact, many of them are part of transnational political elites that have consistently evolved after World War II in an environment saturated with networking among NGOs themselves; NGOs and multilateral agencies, notably the United Nations and multilateral banks; and among NGOs and national governments.

Given the existence of these two major segments I will term the political counter-hegemonic movement the anti/alter-globalization movement. The literature on the anti/alter-globalization movement still needs to increase in quantity and complexity. There is a special need for ethnographies. Most of this literature is made up of works written by activists, NGO members, as well as by the movement’s leaders and ideologues. There are also essays by scholars with different degrees of knowledge, theoretical sophistication and sympathy for global/transnational activism. It is not uncommon to find among them researchers that were previously interested in the analysis of the environmental movement and that switched to the discussion on transnational activism and global civil society. The latter body of literature is where the more elaborate works and thoughts may be found (see Keck and Sikkink 1998; and Keanes 2003, for instance). For researchers interested in doing ethnographies there are two highly promising scenarios to investigate. The street demonstrations are the best scenarios to see anti-globalization activists in action, while the World Social Forums are the best scenarios to see alter-globalization activists in motion.

**Street Demonstrations**

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1 These are analytical working definitions, in many regards a simplification of the dynamics of positions, alliances and exchanges occurring within the anti/alter-globalization power field.
Neoliberalism and global trade without barriers fuelled the shrinking of the world under the hegemony of flexible capitalism. The time was ripe for new institutions to congeal. This is typically the case with the World Trade Organization, a global institution committed to fostering, administering and overseeing global trade as well as to settling disputes among member countries. The WTO was established in 1994. It began operations in 1995 and rapidly became, together with the post World War II institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United Nations), one of the most powerful members of the global management select club. WTO presents itself as ‘the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established in the wake of the Second World War.’\(^2\) Notwithstanding this genealogical relation, the World Trade Organization’s reach in keeping with the hegemony of electronic and computer capitalism went well beyond that of GATT’s since it included not only trade in merchandise goods but also in services (international telephone services, for instance) and intellectual property protection. The WTO’s power caught the attention of a growing anti-globalization activism.

Since the late 1990’s, anti-globalization street demonstrations have proliferated always closely monitored and often repressed by the police.\(^3\) From May 18 through May 20, 1998, thousands of protesters marched through Geneva’s streets in protest against the World Trade Organization’s 50\(^{th}\) anniversary celebrations. One hundred and seventeen people were arrested. In June 1999 (18-20) 35,000 marchers took to the streets of Cologne, Germany, during a G7 meeting to demand the cancellation of poor countries’ foreign debt. On November 30\(^{th}\), 1999, the street demonstration in Seattle against WTO’s ministerial conference, the organization’s top level decision-making body, took place. This was for many the anti-globalization movement’s foundational event. It was surely a prominent moment but there were other important antecedents in the global South such as the protests against IMF Structural Adjustment Programs which started in the late 1970’s, ‘peaking perhaps in the 1989 Caracas uprising’ (Yuen 2001: 6) and the Zapatista rebellion, in 1994, a source of inspiration for an ‘increasingly


\(^3\) See, for instance, *Correio Braziliense*, September 27, 2000, “Pancadaria nas Ruas,” pg. 17, and “Feijão com Arroz contra McDonald’s,” pg. 18; and Seoane and Taddei (2001).
militant movement of global resistance to neoliberalism’ (Callahan 2001: 37). Mary King (2000: 3-4) considers that the anti-globalization movement:

‘traces its own lineage in a half myth, half vernacular history to an invitation that floated over the Internet to all who would travel to The Zapatista Conference Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity in Chiapas, 1996. Many participated and what emerged from that gathering was a nebulous entity called Global Action, not an organization or a NGO itself but rather a self consciously political movement which cast a wide and tattered net. (…) From the Zapatista philosophy the movement adopted an ethics of radical inclusion and self-mobilization.’

The intensity of the ‘Seattle battle,’ the political victory that the obstruction of the WTO’s ministerial meeting implied, as well as the visibility it had in the media showed that the anti-globalization movement was gaining momentum and made Seattle 1999 the primary symbol of a period when people regained the streets to struggle against globalization. In Seattle, 50,000 people were on the streets and more than 500 were arrested.

The year 2000 was particularly busy. There were demonstrations on January 29, against the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland; in February, in Bangkok, against the Tenth Summit of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); on April 15-17 in Washington during an IMF meeting; on June 14, in Bologna, against the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) meeting; on June 21-23, demonstrators protested in Okinawa, during a G7 meeting, for the cancellation of third world debt and the withdrawal of the American base; in September between ten-thirty thousand people demonstrated in Melbourne, against a meeting of the World Economic Forum. That same month, on the 26th, during the Fifth Global Action Day, activists from many countries were focusing on the demonstrations that were to take place in Prague against a joint IMF – World Bank meeting. In the capital of the Czech Republic, environmentalists, religious groups, unionists, socialists, communists, anarchists and punks surrounded the convention center and engaged in skirmishes with the police. Simultaneously, different

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4 There are other previous events that are part of the anti-globalization movement see the ‘Map of Resistance’ by James Davis and Paul Rowley (2001: 26-27). Yuen (2001: 06) is aware of the geopolitical implications of stressing the global South as a historical protagonist: ‘By understanding these antecedents to Seattle, the movement in the overdeveloped world may be less seduced by illusions of its own centrality and will perhaps see more clearly that the global majorities are not merely passive victims of ‘free trade’ and structural adjustment.’
demonstrations happened around the world. In Brasilia, for instance, a small group of punks demonstrated in front of Brazil’s Central Bank. In São Paulo, students, environmentalists, and unionists demonstrated in front of the stock market. In other Brazilian cities, such as Fortaleza and Belo Horizonte, protesters gathered in front of such ‘capitalist symbols’ as a Citibank branch and a MacDonald’s. In tune with escalating police repression of these demonstrations, in July 2001, in Genoa, Italy, during an anti-G-8 demonstration, a young man, Carlo Giuliani, was killed by the police.

September 11th, 2001, undoubtedly posted a new warning on the horizon. Antiterrorism became a major preoccupation for powerful state elites and the agenda became heavily marked by the threat of war. In the United States, the Bush administration passed stringent security laws. But that did not imply, especially outside the United States, that the anti-globalization movement had come to a halt (see Aguiton 2003). In Europe, in Florence, there was another great demonstration in November, 2002. Almost one million people went to the streets on the last day of the gathering of the European Social Forum. There were also the second and third editions of the World Social Forum (see below), in Porto Alegre, in January 2002 and 2003, which brought together more than 50,000 people from many different countries. Also, twenty thousand participants attended the Asian Social Forum in Hyderabad, India in January 2003. At the same time, after September 11th, the possible invasion of Iraq unleashed a movement for peace that resulted in the largest global demonstration ever. Cyberspace’s instrumentality in transnational articulation proved again its effectiveness during the organization of the ‘greatest anti-war demonstration in history,’ according to the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo (February 16, 2003). On February 15, 2003, more than 5 million people in about 60 countries took to the streets to protest against the United States war against Iraq (see table 1).

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5 The Folha de São Paulo (February, 16, 2003) called the demonstrations an ‘unprecedented global action, mainly articulated via Internet.’
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Protesters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>250,000</td>
<td>Auckland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>Santiago de Chile</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,542,000</td>
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The anti-globalization movement’s international expansion has increased its heterogeneity and brought new political challenges for its reproduction. Its heterodox diversity, highly praised for its effectiveness and novelty, also means a more complex political environment in which political alliance problems abound. Suffice it to enumerate the different actors that come together in these scenarios: punks, anarchists, students, unionists, environmentalists, peasants, feminists, human rights activists, scholars, intellectuals, and politicians. Most have progressist leanings and come from a different array of countries. Nevertheless, different combinations of such actors may vary according to where the demonstrations take place. In Europe, especially in countries with strong socialist traditions, socialist politicians, for instance, may also take part in these events.

Some of the organizations that planned Seattle in 1999, like People’s Global Action, Direct Action Network, Independent Media Center, Earth First! and Global Exchange have remained engaged in the anti-globalization movement. Direct Action Network was particularly active in the preparation of the Seattle demonstration and became a ‘soft structure’ (Aguiton 2003:9) that in events such as the Washington demonstration against the IMF and the World Bank in April 2000, organized ‘spokes-councils,’ meetings with delegates from the different groups involved and which were held in churches before the demonstrations (idem).

Anti-globalization is a movement in which young people make up the majority. They are well aware of the new media’s effectiveness in the mobilization effort. The Internet has been crucial to the movement’s articulation on the global level while cell
phones are often used to organize street demonstration tactics. In addition to flexibility and horizontality in the decision-making process, some of the main characteristics of the movement’s organizational structure are related to an overall but not complete adhesion to (1) ‘the tradition of mass civil disobedience commonly known as Non-Violent Direct Action’ (Yuen 2001:8) and (2) a commitment to direct democracy (idem). Its organizational forms include, besides decentralized spokes-council meetings, ‘affinity groups’ and consensus process. According to Eddie Yuen (ibidem):

‘Ideological nonviolence and a deep commitment to direct democracy can … be seen as twin responses to the negative model of authoritarian Marxist-Leninist parties intent on seizing state power which had appealed to many radicals in the last century. The notion of pre-figurative politics – in which the means for attaining a nonviolent, noncapitalist and truly democratic society must be consistent with the goal – remains at the core of the direct action movement. Many activists in the new movement, however, appear interested in decoupling radical democracy and ideological nonviolence, wholeheartedly embracing the former but arguing for more strategic flexibility with the latter, particularly in regard to collective destruction of corporate property.’

Direct democracy is thus a core value for these activists. The movement’s flexible and fluid character is well captured by Mary King (2000:4) when she describes Global Action:

‘Global Action is a loose constellation of organizations, affiliates, NGOs, individuals, anarchists, religious and even government agents. The constitution is shifting, ambiguous and fluid. Individual membership may be routine or occur only once at a particular action. Global Action has certain contact points that only exist externally to others when it deems necessary to materialize. Members don’t necessarily identify with all of the fractured causes but they do relate to points along the spectrum of action (…) They are aligned with the momentum. (…) They may have diverse backgrounds but share the same global targets. They also have one more thing in common, a sense of earth citizenship which transcends national boundaries’

Some authors (Aguiton 2003; Yuen 2002) underline the anti-globalization movement’s ideological and organizational differences when compared to the social struggles of the 1960’s. Its main targets are not state or governmental organizations, rather it struggles against corporate capitalist symbols. Furthermore, there is little, if any, political party influence. Mary King (2000: 5) summarizes this issue by saying that diversity is the movement’s self-identity. She believes that ‘conflicts no longer dissolve
into ready made categories of division and they are less likely to be identified in terms of class antagonisms, control over territory or nationalist aspirations. Rather, struggle centers around the manipulation of information, knowledge, interpretation and communication’ (2000: 6). What may underlie this diversity are the same engines that fuelled post-modernist visions and metaphors of subject’s fragmented identities, dissemination, deterritorialization and networks within the academic world in the 1990’s. I am referring to the ideological and utopian crisis opened up at the end of the 20th century by the collapse of really existing socialism, a discourse that, in one way or another, used to galvanize most of the alternative discourses against capitalism. Older alternative political movements had on their horizons, highly unifying political theories, such as Marxism-Leninism, and categories such as class and revolution. They were also able to rely on a political subject, the revolutionary proletariat, located in a structural (op)position in a system clearly defined in terms of contradictory forces. This did not mean, however, that such movements were homogenous.

The discussion on ‘new political subjects’ is marked by the need to identify a collectivity prone to political change. It is surely related to the ideology and utopia crisis I referred to but also to changes in the nature of ‘real public space’ brought about by the flourishing of ‘virtual public space’ (Ribeiro 2003), a growth caused by new means of communication, as well as by an increase in the circulation of difference provoked by globalization processes.

As we know, the anti-globalization movement is to a large extent the coming of age of trends inaugurated by the environmental movement in the late 1980’s and which developed through the 90’s. Although sharing the same cause, the struggle against exclusionary globalization processes, the movement is globally fragmented. All the same its global articulation is strengthened by two virtual and globalizing agencies: the media and the Internet.

Awareness of the media’s importance in contemporary politics was inherited from such political actors as Greenpeace, Earth First! and the Zapatistas. It led the anti-globalization movement to value political action regarding the media and to look for alternative media practices. Struggling for a critical planetary citizenship, the movement is a particularly relevant constituent of the transnational virtual imagined community, the symbolic basis of the global civil society propitiated by the diffusion of the Internet
as a means of interactive communication (Ribeiro 1998). Another pertinent aspect of the movement’s effectiveness is related to invading the world system with alternative mediascapes, with news that compete with information from global media corporations and chains. This is why demonstrations and forums are held in situations where not only global elites but the global media are present and perform a global media event. It is never too much to stress the role that environmental activism has played in the trend: from ‘think globally, act locally,’ to the awareness that the struggle against oppressive racist and environmentally destructive globalization needs to be fought in the global-fragmented spaces where transnational elites and managers perform their global integration rituals. A sensitivity to the role of information was already present in the Rio-1992 conference when the Internet was widely used to mobilize the transnational virtual imagined community by means of the Association for Progressive Communication’s work (idem). Faithful to this trend, the anti-globalization movement has fostered the creation of Independent Media Centers worldwide. The first indymedia was established by various independent and alternative media organizations and activists in 1999 for the purpose of providing grassroots coverage of the WTO protests in Seattle.

Street demonstrations may also be seen as communication devices. Their purpose is to affirm the existence of a new political subject and to invade real and virtual public space with alternative messages on globalization. Quantity and quality play strategic roles in these scenarios. The size of the movement is a quantitative measure of its power. The effectiveness of the alternative discourses can be measured by its global visibility and dissemination, a proof of the quality of the movement’s message. Diversity, closely related to quantity and quality, gives an idea of the movement’s scope, complexity and representativeness. It is transclassist, transgender, trans-ethnic, transnational, trans-ideological, trans-utopian and trans-behaviorial. Form and organization are crucial because they show, in practice, a different collective identity that is plural and combative. The global media’s attention is captured by the costumes some activists wear, the carnival like atmosphere of some demonstrations, the dramatization of parades and by the eminent and often real risk of violent street battles.

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6 ‘The Independent Media Center is a network of collectively run media outlets for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of the truth. We work out of a love and inspiration for people who continue to work for a better world, despite corporate media’s distortions and unwillingness to cover the efforts to free humanity’ (www.indymedia.org).
Attracting the media is a role especially well performed by punks and by the massive display and use of repressive power.

The police are the most evident state representatives, expressions of local and national levels of power at these demonstrations. City and federal authorities know that the world is watching them. Street demonstrations as counter-hegemonic mega global events are thus informed by the same triangle that structures other non-hegemonic political global events attracting worldwide attention: 1) the rich and powerful gather in impressive scale 2) the alternative trans-national agents meet in impressive scale 3) national and local authorities try to control their public spaces, in order to control the mediascapes that are produced from their territories.

These demonstrations have occurred in different cities around the world and gained media visibility at global and national levels. They have reinforced the idea that another world is possible. This is, indeed, the motto of the World Social Forums.

World Social Forums

The World Social Forums (WSF) are part of the same historical genealogy of anti-globalization movements. In contrast to the anti-globalization street demonstrations I consider them as examples of the alter-globalization struggle. Undoubtedly, anti-globalization forces also participate in the WSF. However, some of the Forum’s most influential organizers are agencies that clearly accept globalization as a historical fact but aim at changing its quality. This is, for instance, the case with ATTAC, the Association for (the) Taxation of Financial Transactions for Citizens’ Assistance, founded in June 1998 by *Le Monde Diplomatique*, the French newspaper. At the opening of the first World Social Forum, Bernard Cassen, general director of *Le Monde Diplomatique* declared that ‘we are not against globalization, but we are critical of how it is put into effect’ (O Estado de São Paulo, January 26, 2001).

Box 1 – Attac’s self-definition

’a network, with neither ‘hierarchical’ structures nor a geographical ‘center.’ Pluralist, it is enriched by the variety of its components and makes common action easier without limiting it in any way, or dictating their freedom of contribution. It aims to reinforce, to link and to coordinate, at an international level, the contribution of all its partners who see themselves as fitting into the structure of its platform. In the same way, it wishes to reinforce its cooperation
with all other networks whose objectives converge with its own. It has over 80,000 members worldwide. It is an international network of independent national and local groups in 33 countries. It promotes the idea of an international tax on currency speculation (the Tobin Tax) and campaigns to outlaw tax havens, replace pension funds with state pensions, cancel Third World debt, reform or abolish the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, more generally, regain democratic space that has been lost to the financial world. ATTAC combines activism with intellectual creativity. It promotes practical economic reforms meant to tame the devastating power of financial markets, and to favor democratic, transparent economic structures that serve ordinary people’s needs. It looks for alternatives to the dogmatic ideology of neoliberalism. ATTAC is independent from all political parties, and brings together labor unions, associations, MPs, academics and citizens from all walks of life, in self-education and peaceful action. ATTAC took part in the demonstrations at Seattle in 1999 against the WTO, and at Genoa in July 2001 against the G8. It is part of a diverse global movement that promotes democratic self-determination for local and regional economies’ (http://attac.org.uk/attac/html/index.vm, accessed on January 16, 2005).

In early 2000, ‘under the impact’ of the 1999 Seattle battle, a World Social Forum that would take place simultaneously with the World Economic Forum started to be thought out (Seoane and Taddei 2001: 106):

‘A collective of Brazilian social movements and organizations accepted the challenge with support from Le Monde Diplomatique (...) The city of Porto Alegre, with its experience in democratic management came to the spotlight through its unprecedented experience in participatory budgeting promoted by the city’s leftist government headed by the Workers’ Party (PT). It earned approval from promoters of the idea that it was the most appropriate place for the WSF to take place. With enthusiastic support from the Rio do Grande do Sul state [also governed by the Workers’ Party, GLR], support that lasted during the Forum, … the call was unanimously endorsed at the June 2000 meetings of the Parallel Social Summit, a gathering parallel to a meeting organized by the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland’ (idem).

From the onset, the World Social Forum was considered as a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, widely conceived as the meeting where the hegemonic neoliberal global elite convenes. The first World Social Forum was held at the Pontifical Catholic University in Porto Alegre, between 25th and 30th January, 2001. According to the organizers, there were more than 15,000 participants with 4,702 being delegates from 117 countries; 104 panelists and expositors (27 Brazilians and 69 from other countries); 165 special guests from 36 countries (77 Brazilians, 88 from other countries). Two thousand young people and 700 Indians camped in the Harmony Park. One thousand eight hundred and seventy accredited journalists – 1,484 Brazilians, 386 from other countries -- disseminated the news about WSF. There was a fair of
social movements, publishing houses, NGOs, with 65 exhibitors and 325 accredited persons. Simultaneous translations of the panels were conducted by 51 translators (Seoane and Taddei 2001: 127-128).

In the mornings there were 4 simultaneous conferences restricted to ‘registered delegates, representatives from organizations around the world’ (WSF 2001: 7). The conferences were broadcast over cable TV, Internet and could also be seen by non-delegates in a public auditorium downtown Porto Alegre. They were organized around 4 main themes: the production of wealth and social reproduction; access to welfare and sustainability; the affirmation of civil society and public spaces; political power and ethics in the new society. Scheduled lecturers were well known activists, unionists, scholars or politicians such as Samir Amin, Walden Bello (professor, University of the Philippines), Bernard Cassen (director of *Le Monde Diplomatique*), Oded Grajew (president of Ethos Institute, Brazil), Yoko Kitazawa (president of Jubileo 2000-Japan); Marina Silva (Senator, Brazil); Fray Beto (Brazil); Park Hasson (representing the union KCTU, South Korea); Thimothy Ney (representing the Free Software Foundation); Boaventura de Souza Santos (professor, University of Coimbra); Tariq Ali (Pakistan); Armand Mattelar (Belgium); Aminata Traoré (former Minister of Culture, Mali); Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria); Kirstem Maller (Director, Global Exchange); Anibal Quijano (professor, University of San Marcos, Peru); Ricardo Alarcón (president of Cuba’s parliament), and many others.

In the afternoon, there were ‘workshops’ organized by institutions participating in the Forum. The general public could have access to almost all of the workshops on a first come first served basis. A myriad number of subjects was discussed but most revolved around issues concerning labor practices and unionism, the environment, agrarian reform, development, health, education, pacifism, human rights, racial/ethnic relations, cultural politics, social and political democracy, citizenship, media and communication, social movements, social justice, global geopolitics, global civil society, transnational activism and resistance against neoliberal globalization. Workshop organizers were mainly Brazilian NGOs, unions and scholars, followed, in number by their peers from Latin America, Europe (especially from Italy and France) and the United States. Some organizations from the state of Rio Grande do Sul and the city of Porto Alegre as well as from the Brazilian Catholic church were also active.
There was a cultural program that included dance, theater and music presented almost exclusively by Brazilian artists at different points in Porto Alegre.

As with many other rituals, the WSF starts and ends with special ceremonies that inaugurate and close a period of ritual activities, a period of communitas to use Victor Turner’s (1969) well-known notion. For instance, in the 2003 edition of the WSF, held a few months before the Iraq war, the ‘March of Diversity Against the War’ started the 6 day-long event and had as its motto the ‘construction of another world is possible against militarization and war’ (WSF 2003: 4). The ‘March of Diversity Against the War’ set out from the Intercontinental Youth Camp and went to a square in downtown Porto Alegre where there was a ‘concentration of drums and voices for peace. The Program for that year’s Forum invited ‘all to take their percussion instruments and flags of their regions, countries and movements. After the march, Intercontinental Youth Camp representatives will collect the greatest number of pennants they can to create at the end of the WSF the Flag of Flags which will be one of the symbols of multiculturality’ (idem). The third World Social Forum ended with a party thrown at the Sunset Amphitheater by the Guaíba river.

Box 2 – WSF’s Self-definition

The World Social Forum is an open meeting at which civil society groups and movements opposed to neo-liberalism and a world dominated by capitalism or by any form of imperialism, but engaged in building a planetary society centered on the human person, come together to pursue their thinking, to debate ideas democratically, formulate proposals, share their experiences freely and engage in networking for effective action (…). The WSF aims to debate alternative means to building globalization in solidarity that respects universal human rights and those of all men and women of all nations as well as the environment’s, and is grounded in democratic international systems and institutions at the service of social justice, equality and the sovereignty of peoples.

accessed on January 16, 2005.

The World Social Forums grew tenfold in five years, from the 15,000 participants in 2001 to the 155,000 who went to Porto Alegre in 2005 (Correio Braziliense, February 1, 2005). Four editions were held in Porto Alegre, another, in 2004, in Mumbai, India. The Forum’s organizational structure has varied a little over these years. Its growing importance has prompted an increased formalization in its political structure. A Charter of Principles was drafted and an International Council created to ‘make the WSF’s articulation process viable on the international level’ (www.forumsocialmundial.org.br). The Council, a ‘political and operational body,’ is
made up ‘of thematic networks, movements and organizations that have accumulated knowledge and experience in the search for alternatives to neoliberal globalization’ (idem).

In comparison with street demonstrations, World Social Forums are alter-globalization mega events that are highly structured, institutionalized and hierarchical. They are mega global integration rituals of transnational alter-native political elites with a basic two-layered structure. First, there are the open, ‘self-managed’ activities, a set of more horizontal communicative encounters. These usually are hundreds of workshops, seminars, courses, meetings and other initiatives proposed by NGOs, unions, social movements, churches, etc. They represent smaller rituals in which segments of the transnational imagined virtual community that share specific interests meet and interact in real public space. Some of these are transnational activists that may have been in touch with others from different countries through the virtual public space provided by the Internet. They are often meeting face-to-face for the first time. Secondly, there are the Panels, Conferences, Testimonies and Round Tables of Dialogue and Controversies where the political and intellectual elite of the anti/alter-globalization movements perform their roles as global leaders and acquire more prestige and power. These are highly structured encounters and their participants defined by powerful members of the WSF organization. In 2005, the International Council, was responsible for these definitions.

All meetings are to produce proposals to guide the movement’s political action. In order to democratize the wider public’s access to proposals, organizers set up a Great Wall of Action where these proposals are to be posted. The 2003 program announced:

‘all actions and issues will be considered, those proposed by a small or a large number of movements or organizations. There will be room for all proposals on the Wall. The Wall of Proposals will make clear that the Forum goes beyond the analysis and discussion of Neoliberalism. Delegates to the Forum are essentially people already engaged in the struggle for a new world so that they exchange experiences during the event, learn with others, reflect profoundly and articulate their perspectives nationally and internationally. Once the Forum has come to an end, they go back to their actions with more knowledge, alliances, projects and energy to continue the struggle” (WSF 2003: 18).

However, the conferences and other events with the leaders and ideologues of the anti/alter-globalization movement are examples of a hierarchical structure in place.
These encounters present a political and age cleavage often perceived by young participants as a dividing power line and as an indication of the World Social Forum’s elitist character. The invitation of celebrities is a standing policy. In 2005, José Saramago, Manuel Castells, among many other intellectuals, were at a Forum that also included participation from Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, the president of Brazil, and Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela.

Indeed, the World Forums have become a polinucleated power field (on this notion see Barros 2005) in itself, one where, in spite of the idiom of decentering and horizontality, there are several agents and agencies who have more power than others in the structuring of the ritual as well as more access to the power the ritual produces. This is reflected, for instance, in the composition of the 2003 Organization Committee made up of a few of the largest Brazilian NGO’s; a powerful union confederation; the Landless Movement, the most powerful Brazilian social movement; and the Catholic Church. In 2004, when the Forum was organized in India, the event also reflected this country’s civil society’s political and social structure. Organizers were divided into 4 categories: The India General Council (the decision-making body for the WSF India process); The India Work Committee (responsible for formulating policy guidelines that formed the basis for the functioning of the WSF India process); The India Organizing Committee (the WSF’s executive body); and the Mumbai Organizing Committee. On the Indian Working Committee, for instance, there were sizable representations of Dalits, the caste also known as the untouchables, and Adivasis, a general term that is used to refer to the ‘tribal societies’, distinct from Hindu society.

The tensions between anti and alter globalization forces have been clearly expressed since the first Forum. The Landless Movement, for instance, criticized the ‘light left’ -- the NGOs, the Workers’ Party and Le Monde Diplomatique -- that organized the event (Folha de São Paulo, January 26, 2001, A8). Contrary to the organizers’ orientations, a group of 40 punks and anarchists threatened to invade a McDonald’s restaurant (idem). Landless Movement Activists ‘invaded experimental

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The 2003 Organizing Committee was made up of ABONG (Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais), ATTAC (Ação pela Tributação das Transações Financeiras em Apoio aos Cidadãos), CBPJ (Comissão Brasileira Justiça e Paz-CNBB), CIVES (Ação Brasileira de Empresários pela Cidadania), CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores), IBASE (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas), MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra) and Rede Social de Justiça e Direitos Humanos.
plantations of the Monsanto transnational corporation’ to protest transgenic food and to defend small-scale farming. José Bové, the French anti-globalization leader, later joined the MST in another demonstration against Monsanto. On the Organizing Committee only a few organizations have relations with popular movements. In 2001, for instance, out of 8 members only 2, CUT and MST, had such connections. Indeed, the Organizing Committee is made up mostly of NGOs ‘dominated by intellectuals and similar sectors from the middle classes’ (Barros e Silva 2001: A8). Given their reliance on city and state government support, organizers wanted to avoid any kind of confrontation that could get out of control. The absence of street fights with the police points to the importance of alliances with state apparatuses and to the alter-globalization movement’s reformist character. Ignacio Ramonet, director of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, wrote in his newspaper that the Forum exists ‘not to protest, like in Seattle, Washington, Prague and other places, against injustices, inequalities and disasters provoked almost everywhere by the excesses of Neoliberalism, but to try, this time in a positive and constructive manner, to propose a theoretical and practical framework that envisages a new kind of globalization in which another world, less inhumane and more cooperative, is possible’ (Barros e Silva 2001: A14).

A survey carried out at the 2004 Forum in India with 3.5 thousand participants indicated that 63% had university degrees (Jornal do Brasil, January 17, 2005). During preparations for the 2005 Forum, the Organizing Committee admitted to the Forum’s ‘elitist’ character. The chair of IBASE, one of the most influential NGOs among the organizers, said that major activities, such as conferences and panels, previously defined by the International Committee, were defined for the 2005 meeting through ample consultation made via the Internet. He added:

‘- We are the elite of the organizations and social movements. If people don’t have the money to go to the forum, the forum will have to go to the people’ (idem).

Consequently, the Forum moved out of the Pontifical Catholic University that was ‘too closely associated with a space for the elite.’ In order to encourage slum dwellers’ participation, organizers planned to serve them 20,000 meals per day. They also stopped paying for VIP trips that used up around US$ 500 thousand. Part of this money was destined to bring representatives of native peoples from North and South
America, Pakistanis and Indians, as well as to subsidize buses traveling to Porto Alegre from all Brazilian state capitals (idem).

The WSF is a power magnet. This becomes evident during the political processes that precede the annual event and in the attraction the Forum exerts over political actors. Major political actors from the progressist camp want to have their presence spotlighted at the Forum. It is especially important if their participation is publicized by the media. From the current president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who has been to all WSFs held in Brazil, to superstars from the academic and artistic worlds, many want to be seen at this global media event. Rituals are effective communication devices not only for those who participate in them but also for those who, thanks to different media, are informed of or may follow their unfolding.

As a mega global ritual of integration the WSF brings together different agents anchored in different levels of social agency. There are the local agents represented by the municipality of Porto Alegre, the local universities, intellectuals, politicians and civil society members. Agents acting at the regional level are also very much present either through the Rio Grande do Sul state government’s pro-active involvement, this state’s capital being Porto Alegre, or through the presence of other actors from Brazil’s southern region or even from Uruguay and some provinces of Argentina that have historically and culturally been part of a same international region. The presence of national agents and agencies is noticeable in the involvement of several national NGOs, union confederations, churches, political parties, federal government organizations, etc. International and transnational agents should be expected at a mega global event and this indeed is the case. National and ethnic diversity is a key characteristic of the World Social Forums. For, ever since the first forum, participants came from more than 117 countries. In events that are often compared to Babel, translators, many of them volunteers, abound. NGO’s, transnational activists, international foundations are, to a great extent, the reason for the WSF’s existence. The plurality of actors located at different levels of integration, with different political, social and cultural reach, is the Forums’ greatest political capital. In reality, the Forums have been major opportunities for networking in real public space within the non-hegemonic globalization movement. As scenarios where the transnational virtual imagined community may meet outside of cyberspace, the Forums play an important role in the making of a global civil society.
Seoane and Taddei (2001: 106) indicated that city and state politics were instrumental in the organization of the first WSF. Indeed, it was sponsored by the Rio Grande do Sul State Energy Company and the Rio Grande do Sul State Bank. In fact, Rio Grande do Sul is a state that has been run by the Workers’ Party for many years. Further, the city of Porto Alegre, also administered by the Workers’ Party, lent its support together with the Pontifical Catholic University and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul as well as the Government of the State as a whole. The Forum’s growth and political visibility, propitiated by an increasing concentration of alter-native transnational elites, drew attention from powerful sponsors and supporters. For instance, state-controlled Petrobras, Brazil’s oil company and one of the largest corporations in the country, joined the city of Porto Alegre and the state of Rio Grande do Sul in 2003, one year after the start of the Workers’ Party federal administration. In 2005, Petrobras was joined by other ‘sponsors and supporters’ among them the Banco do Brasil, Brazil’s largest half state-owned bank, Caixa Econômica Federal, another powerful state bank and other powerful state-controlled corporations such as Eletrobrás, Infraero and Furnas. Besides these Brazilian governmental organizations, WSF 2005 has received support from some large international cooperation agencies, almost all backed by Catholic or Protestant churches: eed-Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Services, an organization of Protestant churches in Germany), Christian Aid (an agency of churches in the UK and Ireland), CCFD (Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement, France), n(o)vib (Oxfam, the Netherlands), CAFOD (Catholic Agencies for Overseas Development, a British organization), Rockfeller Brothers Fund (U.S.), Misereor (the German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Cooperation and Development).8

The costs of the first WSF amounted to approximately R$ 2 million, of which 1 million was paid by the Rio Grande do Sul state government and R$ 300 thousand by the city of Porto Alegre. The remaining balance was paid by NGOs (Folha de São Paulo, January 26, 2001, p. A7). In 2001, the use of public funds was already an issue.9

8 Annex 1 lists the WSFs’ sponsors and supporters.
9 ‘Student centers at universities in Rio Grande do Sul protested in front of the seat of the WSF against public financing of the event. Demonstrators booed governor Olivio Dutra (Workers’ Party) when he arrived at the Forum. Through leaflet distribution, students stated they wanted public funds for student loans, research and the founding of a public state university, one of Olívio’s campaign promises’ (Folha de São Paulo, January 26, 2001, p. A7). ‘Diretórios acadêmicos de universidades gaúchas fizeram um protesto, em frente à PUC-RS (onde ocorre a maioria dos eventos do Fórum Social Mundial), contra o uso
In fact, increased allotment of public funding led WSF critics to state that Brazilian taxpayers are sponsoring meetings of people who ‘defend dogmatic ideas that reject freedom’ (Rosenfield 2005: A3). According to this professor of political philosophy at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, ten million (approximately US$ 3.7 million) out of the R$ 14.5 million (approximately US$ 5.4 million) spent on the 2005 Forum came from public sources.

The World Social Forum was planned to be the counterpoint of the World Economic Forum, in Davos, a meeting that has been organized since 1971 by a Swiss foundation which is also a consultant for the United Nations. Financed by more than one thousand multinational corporations, the World Economic Forum was designed to bring together the global political and corporate hegemonic elite. It has been described as ‘a gathering of political and business movers and shakers from all over the world. The meetings and smaller forums in Africa, Asia, South America and elsewhere throughout the year have become powerful attractions, with hundreds of business leaders paying $20,000 per company to come to Davos to hobnob. To many critics, Davos, with its closed-door meetings of executives pursuing contracts and contacts with top politicians and pundits, symbolize the new economic orthodoxy of the late 20th century’ (Whitney 1997). Companies present at the 1997 conference represented an estimated US$ 4.5 trillion a year of business, an amount powerful enough to attract celebrities ranging from Bill Gates, Microsoft chairman, to Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader (idem). In 2001, approximately 3,000 participants gathered in Davos, among them Jacob Frenkel (CEO, Merrill Lynch), Alan Blinder (former vice-president of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank; professor of economics at Princeton University), James Wolfensohn (President, World Bank), John Sweeney (chair, AFL-CIO), Charles Holliday (World Chairman, DuPont), Carleton Fiorina (chair, Hewlett Packard), Henry Paulson Jr. (CEO, Goldman Sachs), George Soros (mega global investor), Vandana Shiva (global environmentalist leader). Since reverberations from the 1999 Seattle battle were still in the air and 2001 was the year of the first World Social Forum, poverty was a subject considered by several participants who also recognized the importance of the anti/alter globalization movement (Gosman 2001).

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10 One American dollar was worth R$ 2.69, Brazil’s local currency, in January 21, 2005.
The novelty of counter-hegemonic global activism certainly contributed to the initiative for organizing an international teleconference among representatives of the two forums gathered on both sides of the Atlantic, in the global North and in the global South. The teleconference did take place in January 28, 2001 (see Correio Braziliense, January 29, 2001, p. 3). In Porto Alegre, 11 World Social Forum representatives, among them Aminata Traore (former minister of culture of Mali), Bernard Cassen (ATTAC/Le Monde Diplomatique), Walden Bello (professor of sociology in the Philippines), Hebe de Bonafini (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires), and the leader of a peasant movement from Honduras, Raphael Alegria, gathered in an auditorium at the Pontifical Catholic University. In Davos, George Soros (mega investor), John Ruggie (chief United Nations counselor), Mark Malloch (head of the United Nations Development Program), and Bjorg Edlud (president of the multinational corporation ABB), gathered in a Protestant church. The one and a half hour long debate was broadcast by the Rio Grande do Sul state’s public Education Channel and watched by a lively crowd of 1,800 people in an auditorium at the Catholic university. It was a harsh exchange that was interrupted when Soros proposed the end of the conversation when Hebe Bonafini, after a heated intervention, asked him whether he knew how many children died of hunger a day in the world.

This teleconference cannot be considered as an encounter with the sole function of reinforcing each side’s social and political identity. It is a clear indication of the awareness that each side has of the importance of drawing the global media’s attention. Davos, for its own spectacular concentration of rich and powerful people, has enjoyed for many years a lot of media attention. However, this was not the case with the Porto Alegre meeting. It is not an exaggeration to say that one of the WSF’s main goals, and, for that matter, the anti/alter-globalization movement’s, is to disseminate other mediascapes about globalization. Part of the strategic effort to couple events such as the forums and the street demonstrations with major gatherings of the global establishment relates to the visibility needs of a movement that understands well the value of circulating other messages within the global media. In addition to their importance as rituals of integration, the WSFs also play a crucial role in generating alternative images and discourses in global circuits so as to reach a much larger and general audience. They are thus opportunities for consolidating and diffusing political, ideological and utopian matrices as well as for articulating networks of action within a still small
counter-hegemonic global elite. Non-hegemonic global political elites’ integration rituals are central in the weaving of networks of transnational activists and agents in real public space.

Conclusions about political non-hegemonic movements

The anti/alter-globalization movement’s diversity is a characteristic that is much emphasized and seen as a novelty by many. Indeed, years ago, it would have been greatly unexpected to see peasant or Indian leaders together with punks at the same protest. Nevertheless we should not forget that diversity was also present in the environmentalist movement and much before in the socialist movement. The First Socialist International was held in 1864 and was made up, for instance, of delegates from at least three countries, England, France and Germany (see Riazanov [1926] 2004). With the heightening of globalization, especially with the increase in time-space compression, today we should expect a greater diversity at such international counter-hegemonic events. There are two factors underlying surprise about the current anti/alter-globalization movement’s internal diversity. First, there is a misunderstanding that implies a simplification of the nature of collective political subjects. The fact that a collectivity represents itself or is represented by the same movement and is willing to reach similar goals does not mean it is not divided by contradictory forces or that it is homogeneously composed. Secondly, there is a conjunctural element related to the discursive crisis opened up by the end of really existing socialism and the loss of its ideological and utopian perspectives’ effectiveness. What was earlier considered as the left is now the focus of debate, an object in flux. Indeed, what the movement’s diversity indicates is the effectiveness of progressive contemporary networking both in real and virtual public spaces.

Both the street demonstrations and the WSFs keep the same ‘structure versus anti-structure’ strategy. It is a rather powerful strategy since it is a way of invading the global media with alternative images and messages allowing for ‘witnessing at a distance,’ one of the forces behind transnational imagined virtual community structuring (Ribeiro 1998). Finally, it should be noted that the anti-alter-globalization movement’s heterodox diversity does not mean that members of traditional leftist currents are not members or leaders of this transnational movement. On the contrary, there can be found
a certain continuity between an old, socialist inspired left and this new global movement.

Economic non-hegemonic globalization: The Foz do Iguaçu/Ciudad del Este transfrontier and the Paraguayan fair in Brasilia

The most visible actors in non-hegemonic economic globalization, street vendors of global gadgets, for instance, are but the tip of the iceberg, in a huge parallel global economy. I call it non-hegemonic globalization not because its agents intend to destroy global capitalism or to install some kind of radical alternative to the prevailing order. They are non-hegemonic because their activities defy the economic establishment everywhere on the local, regional, national, international and transnational levels. Consequently, they are portrayed as a threat to the establishment and feel the power of political and economic elites who wish to control them. The attitudes states and corporations hold towards them are highly revealing. Most of the time such activities are treated as police matters, as the focus of elaborate repressive action. Non-hegemonic economic globalization is a huge universe that does involve illegal activities, such as human and organ smuggling, that need to be repressed. They undoubtedly involve drug-trafficking too. All the same, workers, such as street vendors, whose ‘crime’ is to work outside of the parameters defined by the state are an expressive part of non-hegemonic globalization. It is not my intention to glamorize criminality. However, I want to distance myself from a discussion that is basically state-centric or, in the best cases, has been strongly circumscribed by state norms and regulations, by definitions of what is legal and illegal, often reflecting the history of power relationships among differentiated social segments and classes (for an interesting book on related issues see Heyman 1999). In constructing another angle, I am seriously taking into account one of anthropology’s most powerful assets: the consideration of the agent’s points-of-view.

Non-hegemonic economic globalization is structured by diverse types of segments and networks that congeal in a pyramidal fashion. At the top there are money-laundering schemes, Mafia like activities, all sorts of corruption. However powerful and
elitist many of the agents involved in the parallel global economy may be, they cannot act on their own. There is massive involvement from poor people in the lower segments of this pyramidal structure. For these social actors, non-hegemonic globalization is a way of making a living or of upward social mobility. Networking and brokerage cement this global structure in ways that are comparable to what I have called consortiation, a process that is typical of articulations among transnational, national, regional and local agents around multi-billion large-scale infrastructure projects (Ribeiro 1994, 2002). The activities at the bottom of this pyramid are what I call grassroots economic globalization, a real globalization from below. They provide access to flows of global wealth that otherwise would never reach the more vulnerable ranks of any society or economy. They either open an avenue for upward mobility or the possibility of survival in national and global economies that are not capable to provide full employment for all citizens. I am thus more interested in this segment of the non-hegemonic economic globalization than in its upper echelons.

In the following pages, I will describe the activities of non-hegemonic economic globalization as practiced in the ‘social transfrontier space’ formed by the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu and the Paraguayan Ciudad del Este. Subsequently I will describe one of the largest and most controversial global gadgets markets within Brazil, the so-called Paraguay Market in Brasília, the country’s federal city.

Ciudad del Este/Foz do Iguaçu: social transfrontier as global fragmented space

The 3,940km-long Paraná river in South America is second only to the Amazon. It is also where the most known South-American borders are located. The so-called Tri-Country Border area has frontiers that separate Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (see map 1). In this area, there are three cities, located in each country, that make up an international urban system linked by two international bridges. Foz do Iguaçu is a Brazilian city linked to the Argentinian Puerto Iguazu through the Tancredo Neves bridge (opened in 1985), and to the Paraguayan Ciudad del Este through the Ponte da Amizade (opened in 1965), Portuguese for Friendship Bridge.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation-states</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>State or equivalent</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Bridge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3,761,274km²</td>
<td>36 million (2001)</td>
<td>Misiones</td>
<td>Puerto Iguazú</td>
<td>321,038</td>
<td>Tancredo Neves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>8,514,876km²</td>
<td>170 million (2000)</td>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td>Foz do Iguacu</td>
<td>258,543</td>
<td>T.Neves/ Amizade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>406,752km²</td>
<td>5.1 million (2002)</td>
<td>Alto Paraná</td>
<td>Ciudad del Este</td>
<td>222.274</td>
<td>Amizade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The famous Iguaçu Falls, one of the world’s largest waterfalls, are located in the same area on the Iguaçu river on the Brazil-Argentina border. They attract thousands of tourists to Puerto Iguazu (Argentina) and to Foz do Iguacu (Brazil). Besides global and national tourism there are other globalizing forces that have given the area its particular characteristics. One of them the Tri-country Border Area shares with many other borders around the world: smuggling has existed in the area since colonial times (Grimson 2003). The other was the construction in the 1970’s and 80’s of a binational Brazilian-Paraguayan ‘development project,’ Itaipu, the second largest hydroelectric dam in the world. The Itaipu’s construction was a major happening of hegemonic globalization for it brought together impressive amounts of labor, technology, transnational capital and elites, and meant rapid population growth especially for the cities of Foz do Iguacu and Ciudad del Este. Finally, the environmental movement has put the area’s tropical forests in the global green map and the U.S. imperial security discourse after September 11 has identified the Tri-country border as a haven for terrorists (Ferradas 2004).
The notion of ‘social transfrontier space’ (Jimenez Marcano 1996) is useful in contemplating the particular relationships that develop in places such as the Tri-border Area. It allows for an understanding of the social, cultural, economic, political and kinship relations social agents develop in border areas where the frontier line operates as a complex and rather flexible taxonomic device. States, their apparatuses, agencies and agents, are territorial entities that strive to control the areas under their jurisdiction. Much of the flexibility social agents experience in border zones is related to the inefficiency of state agents or to their connivance with other social agents operating within the confines of the transfrontier space. This notion also allows for the perception of different kinds of agents operating in a given space that necessarily transcends the control imposed by states. It is impossible to define where a social transfrontier space physically ends, especially because it is not created and managed by formal institutions. Since social transfrontier spaces traverse the classificatory logics of national states, the
largest and most complex transfrontier spaces are often transnational realms prone to be
global fragmented spaces linked to global circuits of people, goods and information. 
This is indeed the case with the Tri-country Border Area.

In spite of Puerto Iguazu’s importance in the tri-border area, especially in 
relation to domestic and international tourists that visit the Iguazu National Park and the 
waterfalls in Argentina (Mendonça 2002), the main social transfrontier space in that 
area is structured by the relationships between Ciudad del Este, in Paraguay, and Foz do 
Iguaçu, in Brazil. These two cities comprise a same field of relationships whose growth 
and complexity have become more accentuated in the last two or three decades. The two 
cities together are an important financial center and a major global trading center. They 
are also an ethnically segmented unit. Besides Paraguayans and Brazilians, in this social 
transfrontier space there is the presence of Arabs (especially from Syria and Lebanon; 
among them there are Christians and Muslims), Chinese and other less numerous ethnic 
groups.

My arguments will be based principally on research carried out by Fernando 
Rabossi (2004) and César Pérez Ortiz (2004) on Ciudad del Este. This option is 
consistent with the central role Ciudad del Este plays in attracting thousands of 
Brazilians that visit the city daily to buy imported goods and sell them in their home 
cities. These people sometimes travel more than 3,000 kilometers, they are veritable 
nomadic merchants, people that are always traveling between their hometowns and 
Ciudad del Este. In Portuguese they are called sacoleiros, literally ‘baggers,’ a reference 
to the many bags they carry back home full of gadgets and counterfeits which are sold 
in many street markets sometimes called Paraguayan markets. Brazilian ‘baggers’ are an 
example of economic practices that are current worldwide and are part of what I call 
non-hegemonic economic globalization or economic globalization from below (on 
Bulgarian trader-tourists see Konstantinov 1996, on the importance of the global 
counterfeit industry, especially in East Asia, see Chang 2004). In this sense, these 
traders are alter-native transnational agents.

States and major corporations everywhere, view these activities as illegal, a 
danger to national and global economies. Interestingly enough, these social agents and 
their activities are seldom taken into account in academic literature. Without a doubt, 
they have been relegated to studies that are often labeled with negative denominations
as ‘shadow economy.’ Terms such as ‘smuggling’ and ‘piracy’, used to refer to these activities and social agents, reveal an ancient drive to control them since they mean ‘unfair competition’ for traders and corporations and a major problem for tax-hungry states. The more neutral label ‘informal economy’ seems to forget a crucial issue, that is, the definition of formality or informality is necessarily traversed by power relations. In the following pages, I will describe the activities of this ‘global informal economy’ as it is observable in Ciudad del Este and in one of the largest and most controversial Paraguayan Markets within Brazil, the one located in this country’s Federal District, Brasília.

Ciudad del Este: a global fragmented space

Ciudad del Este is the second most important city in Paraguay, after the capital Asunción. Located on the banks of the Paraná River in front of the Brazilian Foz do Iguaçu, from its beginning in 1957 the city’s fate was tied to its role as a gateway to Brazilian harbors through roads that cut through the Brazilian state of Paraná, reaching the Atlantic Ocean. This more than 730km long corridor within Brazilian territory was to save landlocked Paraguay time and money. It also represented a geopolitical alternative to the river connection to the Atlantic through the Paraguay, Paraná and La Plata Rivers, heavily dominated by Argentina. Construction of the Friendship Bridge, financed by the Brazilian state, began in the mid 1950’s. The bridge was opened only in 1965.

Several measures were taken by the Paraguayan government to facilitate drawing tourists to Ciudad del Este. The qualitative transformation of the city’s economy occurred intensively during the 1980’s with the increase in the numbers of Brazilian ‘shopping tourists’ who regularly visited Ciudad del Este, by then a city considered to be the largest shopping discount center in South America. Indeed, Ciudad del Este has grown to be one of the world’s major trading centers through the re-export of goods. Trader-tourists are attracted by the cheap prices on electronics and computer goods, global gadgets, counterfeits and other commodities, such as imported perfumes, clothes and alcoholic beverages. Many of these are expensive global status symbols. The middle classes often cannot not afford to buy original brand products and end up buying fake copies abundantly found in the streets and stores of Ciudad del Este.
Paraguay, especially Ciudad del Este, is internationally accused of being a major piracy and smuggling center, a situation that is to a great extent sustained by the Paraguayan state’s ambivalent position. On the one hand, it is difficult to effectively control this global informal economy’s operations since part of the Paraguayan elite has been historically involved with it and corruption is rampant in both sides of the border. On the other hand, the state lacks the adequate infrastructure to control what is a huge and complex arrangement of numerous and powerful networks, many of which go beyond Paraguay’s national territory. A similar situation exists on the Brazilian side. The major importance of Foz do Iguaçu as a money laundering center has been denounced many times by the Brazilian press and was the focus of a major investigation by Brazil’s national congress in 2004.

To understand the development of Ciudad del Este into a major center of the grassroots global economy we need to take into consideration Brazilian legislation regarding the entry of imported goods to the country. All Brazilians traveling abroad and re-entering the country through a land border have to go through customs and can carry only US$ 150.00 quota of tax-free imported goods, an allowance valid for a month. This is why thousands of Brazilians and Paraguayans are constantly going to and from between the two cities. These people comprise the so-called ‘ant contraband,’ a mode of trying to evade customs control officials, unable to check all persons or vehicles coming into Brazil. Moreover, many of these officials are also involved in corruption.

Ciudad del Este is often cited as the third largest commercial city in the world, after Miami and Hong Kong (Rabossi 2004: 7). Ciudad del Este’s economic force impacts upon a vast area of South America, including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and other Andean countries such as Bolivia. In Brazil, trader-tourists come as far away as from Recife and Fortaleza, two cities located more than 3,500km away in the Northeast of the country (on trader-tourists from Porto Alegre see Machado 2005). Different sources quote highly variable estimates of Ciudad del Este’s annual trading: from US$ 2.5 billion to US$ 15 billion (idem). Whatever the real size of Ciudad del Este’s economic power, it is not reflected in the city’s architecture or in its public services. If it were not for its hectic trading activities, for a few fancy shopping-centers and for the many foreigners who visit it, Ciudad del Este would resemble any other poor
town in the region. Its downtown, where most of the trading activities are conducted, is strategically located near the Friendship Bridge and, in 2001, concentrated some 1,750 stores (Rabossi 2004: 39). There can be found fancy shopping centers, many stores, small shops and also thousands of street vendors and other workers in the grassroots globalization segment of the global economy. The streets are full of people conducting all kinds of transactions: exchanging currencies, selling food, beverages, global gadgets, or attracting new clients to established businesses. Many of the social agents working in the transfrontier market, as in most trading activities, are brokers that make a living from the difference between what they buy and what they sell.

The major concentration of economic power, embedded in a political and social situation in which corruption has proliferated, represents fertile ground for a series of negative stereotypes to sprout about the city (Pérez Ortiz 2004). Ciudad del Este is often called the home of South American drug cartels, Chinese Triadas, Japanese Yakuza, Italian gangsters, Russian gangsters, Nigerian and Hezbollah terrorists. A darker tone was to be added to the city’s image, after September 11th, 2001. Since the Three Frontiers are home to thousands of Arab migrants and descendants, the area became a hot spot for the new North-American geopolitics, as it was suspected of being a haven for Muslim terrorists (see Ferradas 2004). Social transfrontiers are often seen as spaces out of state control and, as a result, are negatively valued by authorities and the media as zones prone to illegal activities. Such spaces, thus, can easily be manipulated by different political and economic interests since they are liminal zones, hybrids that mix people, things and information from many different national origins, and reveal nation-states’ fragilities.

Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu comprise an ethnically segmented labor market. Many foreign merchants and most Brazilians who work in Ciudad del Este live in Foz do Iguaçu and cross the border daily to work in Paraguay. Many Paraguayans own imported goods stores in Foz do Iguaçu but live in Ciudad del Este. A 1998 survey carried out by Paraguay’s Central Bank with 146 entrepreneurs of Ciudad del Este showed that 28% were Paraguayans; 27% Asians; 24% Arabs; 11% Brazilians and other 10% of non-specified origin (Rabossi 2004: 80). Lebanese and Chinese migrants started to arrive in Ciudad del Este in the late 1960’s, early 1970’s (Rabossi 2004: 205). There

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11 In 1994-1995, the best moments ever for the city’s economic activities, there were more than 6,000 stores in the same area (Rabossi 2004: 62).
is a mosque in each city and Foz do Iguaçu has a Buddhist temple. Japanese and French schools may also be found in Ciudad del Este. The Arab segment is highly visible and is divided into Christians and Muslims, mostly from Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Since the late 1950’s, Lebanese have had a prominent role in Foz do Iguaçu’s growth (Rabossi 2004: 47).

Languages of tourist traders from different parts of the world can be heard in this social transfrontier space. Further, as a consequence of the ethnic segmentation, several languages are commonly spoken in Ciudad del Este. In addition to Spanish and Guarany, the two languages spoken in bilingual Paraguay, Portuguese, Arabic, Cantonese, Taiwanese, English, Hindi and Korean (Rabossi 2004: 2) are the main spoken languages there. The Arab TV channel Al-jazeera has long been watched in Ciudad del Este reinforcing the presence of Arabic as a language. Given the enormous flow of ‘shopping tourists’ from Brazil, Portuguese has become a strategic trading language, a factor that has created economic opportunities for the many Brazilians who work in Ciudad del Este in different occupations. Several surveys and assessments indicate that Brazilians make up the largest segment working in Ciudad del Este (Rabossi 2004: 81).

The Friendship Bridge is crossed by thousands of people everyday. In 2001, the daily average of vehicles and pedestrians crossing the bridge was 18,500 vehicles and 20,000 pedestrians (Rabossi 2004: 42). These numbers include people who ‘cross the bridge only once (a minority), those who come and go at least once a day since they work in Ciudad del Este or Foz do Iguaçu and live on the other side of the border, and those who cross several times carrying loads, guiding someone or driving’ (idem: 43). These people are the Brazilian baggers, ‘shopping tourists,’ tourists from different countries, the paseros (Spanish for passers, meaning people whose job is to pass merchandise from one side of the border to the other) and laranjas (Portuguese for oranges, slang that designates false fronts, people who pretend to be buyers of certain types of merchandise but are really working for someone else, usually for a tourist trader). There are also the thousands who work transporting people and merchandise around in regular taxis, moto-taxis (motorcycles that are taxis), vans, trucks and buses. The Brazilian customs and Federal Police do not possess the adequate infrastructure to control such a multitudinous flow. The busiest days are Wednesday and Saturday,
apparently because they are strategic for maximizing baggers’ weekly working schedules (Rabossi 2004: 89-90). Wednesdays and Saturdays also attract more buyers because these ‘shopping tourists’ are eager to take advantage of the great numbers of people crossing the border, something that makes it more unlikely for a particular person or vehicle to be stopped by customs officials. Great numbers form a non-hegemonic strategy. Long lines often halt the dynamics of an economy that literally relies on movement. Sometimes, for different reasons, mainly due to the tightening of customs control on the Brazilian side, demonstrators may block the bridge creating lines of buses, trucks and cars that run for kilometers. These stalemates are often felt, in different ways, in the many other fragmented global spaces that are interconnected to Ciudad del Este, such as the 25 de Março street, in the city of São Paulo.

In this unique universe of movers and traders *paseros* stand out. Rabossi (2004: 46) considers that they are responsible for most of the deals and transportation of merchandise and correspond to some 5,000 passers, stratified according to those who carry the heavy loads on their backs, on bicycles, motorcycles or cars. In 2001, more than 500 passers were members of an Association of Eastern United Transporters of Loads (idem) in Paraguay. Moto-taxi drivers are also organized in associations (Rabossi 2004: 73). Nationality matters in this transfrontier labor market. *Oranges*, for instance, are Brazilians, usually women who use their monthly allowance to enter Brazil with US$ 150.00 of tax-free imported merchandise. They sell their rights and transportation services to the bagger. *Oranges* dread being stopped by the Brazilian custom. If this happens their entry will be registered and their right to use the US$ 150.00 allowance will only be valid again within a month’s time. If they keep working and are caught by custom officials within this period of time the merchandise on them will be confiscated (Rabossi 2004: 77-78).

There are flows both ways. There are Brazilian goods that are exported to Paraguay, especially cigarettes, to re-enter Brazil as ‘smuggled merchandises.’ At least in some periods, there is evidence that the importance of the Brazil-Paraguay flow was greater than that of the Paraguay-Brazil flow (Rabossi 2004: 47). According to Rabossi (p. 47), Brazilians control the flow of merchandise from Paraguay to Brazil. The financial flows between the two cities are highly complex and are often the target of different investigations by Brazil’s Central Bank and Federal Police. Ciudad del Este
has over 20 banks, several with headquarters in Brazil, Europe and the United States. A study of the Paraguayan Central Bank showed that, between 1991 and 1997, US$ 900 million were transferred to Brazil (see Rabossi 2004: 66). Many armored cars transferring money from Paraguay to Brazil are part of the intensive vehicle flow over the Friendship Bridge.

Market place anthropology has taught, among other lessons, that markets are loci of inter-connections among different ethnic groups, ecological zones and production sites. Ciudad del Este is a place that inter-connects many different production sites. Further, given that the city is a major hub of grassroots globalization, it has connections with different fragmented global spaces in the non-hegemonic global economy. On the one hand, the Arab and Chinese diasporas are instrumental in making the international connections. On the other hand, Brazilian ‘baggers’ are the concrete social agents that connect Ciudad del Este to different fragmented global spaces of popular globalization within Brazil. They usually are small entrepreneurs who run their own businesses in their hometowns, most of the time either as street vendors or as the owners of a stall in the so-called Imported Goods Markets. They are nomads – some travel twice a week -- and seldom are cosmopolitans since most of the time they connect only two global fragmented spaces: the one where they buy their merchandise (Ciudad del Este, in our case) and their point of sale. Their activities thus imply constant traveling, coming and going, sometimes as far as 3,000km or more. They either take regular buses or, together with other colleagues, rent a ‘tourist’ bus. Trips are long and tiresome and also very tense (see Pérez Ortiz 2004 and Machado 2005). When shoppers go to Paraguay, they carry considerable amounts of cash, their earnings and profits, in order to replace the merchandises they have sold. When they go back home, they carry in the buses’ baggage compartment many thousands of dollars in new merchandise. They fear many things. Buses can be robbed on the road either on their way to or from Paraguay. Their merchandise may be confiscated by the Brazilian customs in Foz do Iguaçu. Buses can also be stopped by Federal Highway Patrol anywhere before reaching their hometowns. In this case, either the load is confiscated or steep bribes have to be paid. Last, but not least, accidents are also common and so this turns these people’s trips into a permanent cause for concern among those waiting at home their return. Many baggers consider their trips to Ciudad del Este to be true Russian roulettes where anything can happen (Figueiredo 2001). Moreover, the merchandise bought in Paraguay may still even be
confiscated by Brazil’s federal fiscal authorities during inspection raids on markets where they are sold.

Tourist traders do not see themselves as smugglers. Even the word *sacoleiros*, ‘baggers,’ is considered inappropriate to describe them. They see themselves as workers or traders and try to avoid the negative connotations often attached to their activities. They think of themselves as honest and hard-working people who have found an economic niche that should not be considered equal to illegal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling (for similar situations involving grassroots global trading between African countries France, Germany and Italy, see MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Indeed, there are smuggler rings in the Ciudad del Este/Foz do Iguaçu transfrontier that run complex and large operations which include the use of airplanes and large trucks, the kind of equipment to which trader tourists have no access. As many other informal market workers, trader tourists are ambiguous social agents: they are small entrepreneurs who wish to work honestly but who make money out of niches that escape state control. This ambiguity pervades the many contradictions between ‘baggers’ and state authorities because these traders work in the open air, they sell their merchandises on the streets. Working in public spaces grants a visibility that turns them into political actors. They often organize themselves in associations, which become the collective actors that intermediate the relations between them, the state and politicians. It is not uncommon to see politicians hungry for votes become spokespersons for these social agents of grassroots globalization. In fact, these traders start to have more stable working conditions only after they become political subjects that represent some kind of asset to politicians. Consumers also have ambiguous feelings about them. While they know that the legality of baggers’ activity is questionable, they enjoy having access to goods that are cheaper because they are not taxed or are fake copies. This is why it is so difficult to curb the expansion of what hegemonic economic actors call piracy and smuggling.

Anthropologists still have to make an effort to understand ethnographically this form of contemporary global nomadic trade. Chinese young men and women, for instance, who barely speak Portuguese, are often seen in the streets of Brasilia selling all kinds of global gadgets. West Africans are street vendors in New York and Washington. Africans are also transnational traders in France and other European
countries (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Women from Cabo Verde, the African archipelago, travel to Fortaleza, Brazil, to buy goods they will sell back home. These ‘connectors’ of fragmented global spaces are often ethnic groups such as the Arabs, Chinese and Koreans in Brazil who may take advantage of their diasporic networks around the world. Indeed, Asians, mostly Chinese and Koreans have started to become an increasingly noticeable presence at Brasilia’s Paraguay Market, another major global fragmented space of grassroots globalization.

The Paraguay Market in Brasilia: another global fragmented space.

Brasilia is located some 1,600km from Ciudad del Este. Nonetheless, the Paraguayan city is an important economic force in the life of thousands of Brasilia’s inhabitants. Many of them work in the more than 2,200 booths that make up the Imported Goods Market, today’s official name for the Paraguay Market. The Paraguay Market attracts a great number of shoppers from Brasilia and other cities – the Market has turned into a tourist attraction for those who visit the place looking for discounts on global status symbols. Hundreds of booths sell DVDs, computers, cell phones, software, games, sunglasses, perfumes, cosmetics, clothes, sneakers, alcoholic beverages, the latest movie downloaded from the Internet, etc.

The Paraguay Market, like other global fragmented spaces of grassroots globalization, has a history related to urban economic cycles, migrations, street markets as a source of economic opportunities for the urban poor, and urban conflicts in which social movements, politicians and city authorities get involved time and again (Souza 2000). ‘Smuggling’ is a Federal crime in Brazil and almost everywhere, something that immediately attracts the Federal authorities’ attention to a scenario that otherwise would engage only local authorities. This is even more so the case in a federal capital where the National Congress, the highest courts and institutions of the Executive Power are located, including those responsible for national security and repression of federal crimes. Many different kinds of national and international interest groups also have their offices in Brasilia. Besides being the seat of the Brazilian state, Brasilia has its own mystique as an urban center, since it was inaugurated in 1960 as the quintessential example of modernist ideology on urbanism and architecture. The planned city has 500 thousand inhabitants and was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, a fact that
has reinforced rules and regulations concerning Brasilia’s architecture and the use of its urban space. The first and foremost question Paraguay Market workers have had to deal with was how has it been possible that in the heart of Brazil’s capital a market of smuggled goods has grown.

The history of the Paraguay Market is a history of agents from the grassroots segment of the global economy struggling to become formal economic agents. Since its inception in 1990, with 30 street vendors working in a parking lot along W3 South, a busy avenue, the market has rapidly spread into the more than 2,200 booths it is today. Its transformation from an informal open-air street market to a formal popular market of global gadgets was marked by a series of political struggles that lasted 7 years. In July 1997, the Federal District government removed the open-air market to a new area, located in a less noble and visible place where the Paraguay Market remains up to today. After several political battles and street skirmishes the instability of the street vendors would come to an end. The local government designed a plan through which the ‘baggars’ would become ‘micro-importers.’ It was a way of moving these workers from the informal to the formal market. Now these traders were to pay taxes and to be respected as any other kind of merchant. The Paraguay Market was rechristened the Imported Goods Market. Over the years, a process of internal differentiation has occurred and some merchants have managed to control several stalls, thus expanding their business into fancy stores.

These grassroots globalization social agents are migrants who moved to Brasilia in search of economic opportunities. A research study carried out in 2001 (Figueiredo 2001) showed that 57.5% of them came from Brazil’s northeastern region, the poorest in the country, and a traditional source of migrants to Brasilia. The greatest majority of these traders live in Brasilia’s satellite cities, i.e. outside of the modernist planned city where the upper middle class lives. Ten per cent of these traders come from four northeastern cities an indication of the effectiveness of social networks in the organization of migratory flows. These people are usually related and make up cliques, corporate groups that act in defense of their interests within the market, especially within the two associations that struggle to represent traders vis-à-vis the Federal District’s government. These associations are related to the two major political parties that dominate local politics. The associations’ history is marked by the political
alliances the street vendors had to make while working in the parking lots before they were moved to the new and definitive location.

Given its location in the federal capital, and its power to attract many thousands of consumers, the Paraguay Market gained great visibility in the Brazilian media. The Market was criticized by local merchants and shopping centers that accused street vendors of unfair competition since they did not pay taxes, or have heavy expenses with rents, employees’ wages, décor and other items. Representatives for important industry lobbies located in São Paulo, the country’s main industrial center, such as the Brazilian Toy Manufacturers’ Association expressed their criticisms too. The Paraguayan Market was also criticized by representatives of Brazil’s major export processing zone located in Manaus, 3,500km from Brasilia, in the heart of the Amazon region, with its hundreds of manufacturers, mostly multinational corporation producers of electronic and computer goods. Brasilia’s Paraguay Market became an example of the federal government’s incapacity to control smuggling and piracy. This combination of factors turned the Paraguay Market into a main political issue, debated in the National Congress, in different Ministries, and in different branches of the local executive and legislative powers. Brasilia’s Paraguay Market indicates therefore how fragmented global spaces of non-hegemonic economic globalization interconnect not only economic agents and agencies located at different levels of integration but also political agents and agencies representing powerful established interests anchored in local, national and international dynamics. The fact that these political agents presented the Paraguay Market as a threat to law abiding institutions and citizens clearly indicates how these grassroots globalization activities are part of a non-hegemonic field. They need to be regulated and normalized in order to cease being a threat to the established order.

Brasilia’s Paraguay Market is a rather expressive example of many other nodes of the popular world system. In Buenos Aires Central Market there are some 1,000 booths that sell merchandise bought in Paraguay to as much as 30,000 shoppers a day. Colombia is full of ‘San Andresitos,’ the markets named after the free trade zone on the Colombian island of San Andres in the Caribbean. Downtown Mexico City is full of street vendors with global gadgets to be sold. West Africans on New York’s Fifth Avenue in the 1980’s are another example (see Stoller 2002). In Manhattan, fake Rolexes, sunglasses and all kinds of CDs could be bought on the streets. Shoppers could
also buy fake Rolexes at the world famous Xiu Shui Market, in Beijing. DVDs, shoes, shirts, sweaters, coats, leather jackets, real silk, most with brand names such as Timberland, Tommy Hillfinger, Nike, Adidas, Boss, Gucci, Prada, etc. could be found at this market that was demolished to become a mega shopping center. In a demonstration of how hegemonic economic globalization operates in Beijing, one ‘travel tips’ website proudly states: ‘What was once the home of fake designer brands in Beijing is about to be replaced by a ‘no fakes’, ‘full English speaking’ mega mall.’

Conclusions about non-hegemonic economic practices and agents

Economic non-hegemonic movements are good examples of how structure and anti-structure relations operate. Non-hegemonic systems suppose the existence of hegemonic ones. Such systems also entail the existence of brokerage practices that I will call, connecting mechanisms. The latter are the real processes through which both systems communicate. In our examples above, politics proved to be the channel most capable of creating flows between grassroots globalization agents and those representing long established local, national and global interests. There are connecting mechanisms that clearly relate to economic interests. These are indicated through the money laundering that occurs in the transfrontier social space of Foz do Iguaçu/Ciudad del Este as well as in formal transnational financial instruments such as the many credit cards with which a shopper can buy anything in Ciudad del Este or in the Paraguay Market in Brasilia. The differences between hegemonic and non-hegemonic systems are blurred in the liminal situations in which connecting mechanisms allow for the articulation of common political or economic interests of agents and brokers from both systems. Corruption is also a social practice that fosters interaction between both universes.
GENERAL CONCLUSION

Political and economic non-hegemonic globalization processes are power fields that exist in relation to other established power fields that have the prerogative to normalize the activities involved, by setting the standards of what is and what is not legitimate. Movements for other globalizations are also formed by power-seekers. Alternative political movements seek state power or struggle against it. This is why many of their leaders often become politicians. NGOs and governmental agencies also keep close relations. NGO members often leave their institutions to work in state or multilateral agencies. Alternative economic movements seek access to wealth and to the social, cultural and political benefits arising from it. Since struggles between non-hegemonic movements and the establishment are mainly power struggles, they are often mediated by several state agents. The police are clearly involved when activities occur on the streets such as anti-globalization street demonstrations and cases with street vendors and markets.

The converging of large numbers of people is part of alter-native transnational agents’ strategies. Here the more the merrier prevails. The multitudes involved in open air operations on the streets of Ciudad del Este, on Friendship Bridge and in Brasilia’s Paraguay Market express the numbers of people who participate in this particular segment of popular globalization and represent a form of overwhelming the state structures deployed to manage the situation, a tactic also underlying political counter-hegemonic street demonstrations.

Counter-hegemonic, non-hegemonic and hegemonic processes keep relations analogous to those existing between structure and anti-structure. This does not mean that they represent the exact inverted image or opposite dynamics of each other. I have already mentioned the existence of connecting mechanisms, an indication that many interests that at a first glance may look like opposites may be converging ones. In reality, these processes thrive on each other, something that is clear when we look at the anti-alter globalization movement that chooses to demonstrate or to gather when major meetings of global elites occur. Such is the case with the Davos/World Social Forum mirror like situation as well as with the anti-globalization street demonstrations that happen during WTO, World Bank or G8 meetings. Notions of a shadow economy, of
informal versus formal economies, seem to confirm the existence of relations akin to structure/anti-structure ones. However, grassroots economic globalization agents are not really aiming at constructing another world. In reality, they aim at becoming rich and powerful agents just like those who consider them illegal smugglers or pirates. It is the rich and powerful who, through the control of state apparatuses and wider political structures, create an anti-structural image of the workers and entrepreneurs from the grassroots globalization segment. Without such a social representation it would be impossible to control these activities and ‘informal markets’ would proliferate much more than they actually do.

The construction of translocal links and translocal cultures is also a common characteristic of other globalizations. Translocal links and networking are present in all forms of other globalizations considered here. This indicates that alter-native transnational agents disregard or bypass the normative and regulating power of nation-states. Translocal political links are often studied under the rubric of transnational activism and global civil society. Transnational political cultures still need to be studied more in-depth ethnographically. Most existing studies are on transnational elites, for instance, Ulf Hannerz’ (2004) work on foreign correspondents or my own on the World Bank ethnic diversity (Ribeiro 2003). Studies on transmigrants, such as those by Linda Basch, Nina Glick-Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1994), do reveal transnational agents’ political or economic practices. Other works on migration and transnationalism also show how migrants upset existing boundaries and power structures creating translocal networks and cultures (Kearney, 1996, and Sahlins, 1997, for instance). We still need however a stronger focus on real globalization from below. For this involves processes through which migratory labor and/or contemporary global nomads become involved as alter-native transnational agents in order to get their share of global flows of wealth.

In their practices, transnational political activists by definition rely on transnational links and networks. Similarly, transnational grassroots traders, in their practices, blur borders creating transfrontier social spaces and linking different global fragmented spaces. If we look at the whole span of the networks created between the Paraguay Market in Brasilia and some Asian countries we will see that these traders’ activities rely totally on the functioning of transnational networks that operate through
the articulation of several brokers and global fragmented spaces. In sum, both political and economic alter-native transnational agents rely on highly complex articulations of heterogeneous social agents and on the consortiation of different powers of agency defined at different levels of integration spread on a global scale.

References


ANNEX 1

SPONSORS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE MEETINGS AND OF THE ‘WSF PROCESS’

2001

- Electric Energy State Company of Rio Grande do Sul
- Bank of the State of Rio Grande do Sul
- The city of Porto Alegre
- The Pontifical Catholic University
- Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
- NGOs

2003

Sponsors: Petrobras, Ford Foundation, Fundação Banco do Brasil
Supporters: action aid, cafod, ccfd, eed, heinrich boll stiftung, icco, misereor, n(o)vic Oxfam Netherlands, Oxfam International, Oxfam Belgium, Oxfam America.

2004

WSF process supported by:

Petrobras, Caixa Econômica Federal, the Ford Foundation and Brazil Postoffice.

Support for the World Social Forum 2004, in India:

- Action Aid, United Kingdom
- Alternatives, Canada
- Attac Norge Solidarites, Norway
- Comité Catholique Contre la Faim et pour le development (CCFD), France
- Christian Aid, United Kingdom
- Development and Peace, Canada
- Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED), Germany
- Funders Network on Trade and Globalisation (FNTG), United States
- Heinrich Boll Foundation, Germany
- Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries (HIVOS), Netherlands
- Inter Church Organisation for Development Co-operation (CCO), Netherlands
- Oxfam International
- Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), Sweden
- Solidago Foundation, United States
- Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), Switzerland
- Tides Foundation, United States
- World Council of Churches, Switzerland
- Members of India General Council for their solidarity contribution, India

2005

- Banco do Brasil S.A.
- Petrobras
- Caixa Econômica Federal (Brazil)
- Eletrobrás (Brazil)
- Infraero (Brazil)
- Furnas (Brazil)
- eed - Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Services, an organization of the Protestant churches in Germany)
- Christian Aid (an agency of the churches in the UK and Ireland)
- CCFD (Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement, France)
- n(o)vib (Oxfam, Holanda)
- CAFOD (Catholic Agencies for Overseas Development, a British organization)
- Rockfeller Brothers Fund (U.S.)
- Misereor (the German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Cooperation and Development).